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Abstract:
This paper characterizes the tatonnement of high-frequency returns from U.S. Treasury spot
and futures markets. In particular, we highlight the previously neglected role of the futures markets
in price discovery. The highest futures market shares are in the longest maturities. The estimates
of 5-year and 10-year GovPX spot market information shares typically fail to reach 50% from 1999
on. The GovPX information shares for the 2-year contract are higher than those of the 5- and
10-year maturities but also decline after 1998. Standard liquidity measures, including the relative
bid-ask spreads, number of trades, and realized volatility are statistically signiﬁcant and explain
up to 21% of daily information shares. The futures market gains information share in about 1/4 of
the events where public information is released, but days of macroeconomic announcements rarely
explain information shares independently of their eﬀects on liquidity.
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The market for U.S. Treasury securities provides an excellent context in which to study price
discovery–the process by which information is incorporated into prices. The Treasury market is
highly liquid and receives a steady ﬂow of public information, such as scheduled macroeconomic
announcements. Throughout the 1990s, GovPX consolidated tick-by-tick transactions data from a
high proportion of the spot market, enabling econometricians to study the price discovery process.
These characteristics of the Treasury market make it a natural place to study how heterogeneous
traders impound new information into prices.
There have been two major lines of research on Treasury market microstructure. The ﬁrst of
these has focused on the impact of public information around macroeconomic announcements. The
second strand of research has studied how quotes and trading activity reveal private information.
Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999a) did the seminal work on how Treasury prices respond to
economic news, examining how GovPX trading activity and prices react to the surprise components
of macroeconomic releases. Following this line of research, Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) looked at
the high-frequency behavior of Treasury note yields around FOMC announcements from 1994 to
the end of 2004. They reconcile the high volatility of such yields with modest average eﬀects of
announcements by showing that the reaction of Treasury yields depends on the shape of the yield
curve at the time of announcement. They found that the market reaction to FOMC inter-meeting
moves is sluggish.
Additional research has investigated how prices react to order ﬂow. Green (2004) looks at
the informational role of trading around announcements. Using the Madhavan, Richardson and
Roomans (MRR, 1997) model and GovPX data on the most recently issued 5-year Treasury note,
from July 1, 1991, through September 29, 1995, Green ﬁnds that trades have a greater informational
role in the 15 minutes after macroeconomic announcements and that order ﬂow reveals information
about the riskless rate. With a vector autoregressive (VAR) model and GovPX data from January
1992 through December 1999, Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) ﬁnd that order ﬂow imbalances (excess
buying or selling pressure) account for up to 26% of the day-to-day variation in U.S. Treasury yields
on non-announcement days. The paper also ﬁnds that price discovery is important to understanding
the yield curve. Cohen and Shin (2003) estimate a VAR on quotes and signed trades of 2-year,
5-year and 10-year on-the-run U.S. Treasury notes. They conﬁrm the results of Hasbrouck (1991)–
order ﬂow causes prices–but found that there is often a curious positive feedback eﬀect: price
1increases seem to generate buying pressure during periods of market stress and volatility.
Not all Treasury market microstructure research investigates the reactions to announcements
or order ﬂow. Boni and Leach (2004) also use the GovPX data from October 1997 to investigate
depth discovery–the process by which traders determine the quantity that can be traded at a
particular price–in Treasury markets.
The bond market microstructure literature, with a few exceptions, has largely ignored the
important futures market in Treasury instruments, however, leaving the ﬁndings incomplete. Tse
(1999) ﬁnds that the Tokyo market reveals more information about Japanese government bond
futures than does the London market. Upper and Werner (2002) examine how Bund price discovery
shifts from spot to futures markets at times of crises. Brandt, Kavajecz, and Underwood (2006)
show that futures and spot market order ﬂow are useful in predicting daily returns in each market
and that the type of trader inﬂuences the eﬀect of order ﬂow. Campbell and Hendry (2006) look
at the 10-year bond and futures contracts in both the United States and Canada.
The goal of this paper is to model interaction between the GovPX spot markets and the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) futures market. Our paper extends the price discovery literature
in several ways. This paper is the ﬁrst to estimate the Hasbrouck (1995) and Harris, McInish
and Wood (2002) price discovery measures for several maturities of U.S. Treasury instrument spot
and futures markets. We establish that the futures and the basis adjusted on-the-run Treasury
securities are cointegrated. This enables us to compare the price discovery from liquid spot with
futures instruments and to compute the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. The futures data
contribute substantially to price discovery, often dominating the GovPX market. Studies that
exclude futures data might be misleading or incomplete.
After characterizing the information share measures, we document and explain the cross-
sectional and intertemporal variation in those measures. While information shares vary sub-
stantially day-to-day, a given market’s relative share of trades, spread size and realized volatility
strongly explain its contribution to price discovery. This enables us to estimate information shares
out-of-sample or when there is missing data.
We ﬁnd that days of macroeconomic announcements modestly raise futures market information
shares, particularly in a one-hour window after the announcement. Macro announcements appear
to have their eﬀects on information shares through liquidity/volatility variables, however. The
latter variables subsume the eﬀects of news releases. In contrast, FOMC-related events have
2essentially no eﬀect on information shares.
2. A Model with Multiple Markets
Price discovery seeks to identify which of several markets tend to incorporate permanent changes
in asset prices ﬁrst. That is, to what extent does a market “discover” the price to which all markets
for the security are tending in the long run.
There are two standard methods by which one can apportion weights to markets in the process
of price discovery: The Hasbrouck (1995) information share (H) and the Harris, McInish and Wood
(2002) measure (HMW) which utilizes the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) permanent-transitory
decomposition. The Hasbrouck share H is the contribution of shocks to market i on the total
variance of the permanent component of prices. The HMW weights can be interpreted as the
limits of the changes in the price with respect to the elements of the shock vector, as the time
horizon goes to inﬁnity.
Both of these methods start with the observation that asset prices appear to be very persistent,
and one is generally unable to reject that such prices are I(1). Arbitrage prevents prices of the
same security from diverging in diﬀerent markets, however. I(1) behavior in individual prices,
combined with stationary linear combinations of those prices, implies that prices of similar assets
in diﬀerent markets can be considered a cointegrated process.
2.1 Error-correction model
Hasbrouck (1995) developed the standard measure of price discovery for multiple markets. He
argued that prices pi,t in market i should deviate from some some unobservable fundamental price,
p∗
t, only by some transient noise:
pi,t = βi,tp∗
t + ξi,t. (1)
In the case of the Treasury market, a range of maturities can be delivered at expiry, so our model
extends Hasbrouck to allow for basis adjustments between similar but not identical instruments.1
1 It is quite common with derivative securities to have multiple assets which can be delivered at expiry, and
neither the Hasbrouck model nor the price discovery framework requires the securities to be identical. For the
decomposition we propose in Section 2.4, we only need the prices to be cointegrated. This relationship exists
theoretically because of arbitrage between highly correlated substitutes, and we conﬁrm the cointegration
link empirically.
3The fundamental price itself is assumed, like before, to be a random walk:
p∗
t = p∗
t−1 + ηt. (2)
The error terms may be contemporaneously and serially correlated,
cov(ξi,t,ξj,t−k) = ωi,j,t−k, (3)
with V ar(ηt) = σ2
η.
If the price series are I(1), cointegrated, and have an rth order VAR representation,
pt = Φ1pt−1 + Φ2pt−2 +     + Φrpt−r + εt,










 = ∆pt, (4)
which share a common random walk fundamental, have the convenient Engle-Granger (1987) error-
correction representation,
∆pt = αzt−1 + A1∆pt−1 +     + Ar∆pt−r−1 + εt, (5)
where zt is the error-correction term of rank N − 1.
In most price discovery applications, zt is a vector of diﬀerences in prices between markets.
Because futures prices are not directly comparable to spot bond prices, zt includes coeﬃcients βi,t













The coeﬃcients, α (α > 0), reveal the speed with which deviations between the prices in market 1
and the other markets are corrected. Other things equal, a larger αj indicates a greater speed of
correction to the price in market 1 and less price discovery in market j.
2.2 Futures basis adjustment
A bond is a security that pays a known income (the coupon yield). If one is trading at time t, (t <
T < N), there are two ways to obtain an n-year bond, maturing at N, to hold in one’s portfolio at
time T: (1) buy the asset in the spot market, at price pt,N, and hold the bond until T; or (2) buy
4the n-year bond through a futures contract for delivery at T, at price fcash
t,T,N.2 Buying the bond
in the spot market requires an immediate outlay of cash but garners the purchaser the accrued
interest on the bond from purchase to delivery. The absence of arbitrage ensures the following
relation between the cash futures price and the cash spot price,
fcash
t,T,N
(1 + rt,T)T−t = pcash
t,N − It,T,N , (7)
where It,T,N is the (time t) value of accrued interest on the bond from the trading day (t) to the
contract delivery date (T). The “cash” superscripts denote cash prices, not quoted prices. The




t,N + AIt,N, (8)
where the superscript q denotes quoted prices, and AIt,N is the accrued interest, since the last
coupon payment, on the given n-period bond. Note that the interest accrued between the trading
day and the expiration day, It,T,N, is distinct from the interest accrued from the last coupon
payment to the trading day, AIt,N.
In addition to distinguishing between cash and quoted prices, the CBOT allows the party with
a short position to pick which bond it will deliver. The cash received for futures settlement depends
on which bond is delivered through a conversion factor and the accrued interest on the particular
bond at the time of settlement. For a given deliverable bond, maturing at N, the cash received by




t,T,NCFN + AIt,N, (9)
where CFN is the CBOT’s conversion factor that depends on which bond is actually delivered.
Parties with the short position will pick the cheapest-to-deliver bond by minimizing the net
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where ˜ N indexes the eligible bonds. The bond that minimizes this quantity is known as the
cheapest-to-deliver (CTD).
Assuming that the CTD bond is known and matures at N, (7) implies the following relation
2 Here we assume away any diﬀerence between forward and futures prices by assuming that the futures price
is paid at delivery rather than being marked to market.




(1 + rt,T)T−t = p
q
t,N + AIt,N −
It,T,N
(1 + rt,T)T−t (11)
Therefore, the relation between quoted spot and futures prices (11) for the conversion-factor










(1 + rt,T)T−t. (12)
The only quantity in (12)–besides the quoted spot and futures prices–that varies within the
day is the discount rate, (1+rt,T)T−t. If this quantity is not too variable within the day, compared
to spot and future prices, then intraday spot and futures prices are eﬀectively cointegrated.3 This
discount rate assumption seems reasonable for our relatively close-to-maturity futures contracts
compared with the prices of the much longer time-to-expiry of the 2-, 5- and 10-year bonds.
A diﬃculty with directly using the relation in (12) is that the CTD bond is almost always
an oﬀ-the-run bond, but these bonds are too illiquid to contribute much to price discovery. The
most liquid spot market instruments (by far) are on-the-run bonds. We would like to compare
price discovery in the futures market to the most liquid, but still closely related, on-the-run spot
market instruments. To compare on-the-run bond prices to futures prices, we need to assume that
the on-the-run and the CTD oﬀ-the-run bond prices are cointegrated.4 We assume that a linear
relation links the prices of these bonds of similar maturity,
pt,N∗/CFN∗ = βnpt,N/CFN. (13)
where N∗ denotes quantities pertaining to the CTD bond, N pertains to the on-the-run bond
and βn is adjusted each day in our estimation. The conversion factors are constant within our
daily estimation period. Later, we will show that the use of daily betas is innocuous. There is
no evidence of intraday variation in the βns and that the qualitative inference is very robust to
further restricting variation in βn, including setting it equal to one.
In the case of the 2-year, the interpolation range is only 3 months. 5-year bond delivery range
is also quite narrow, between 4 years and 2 months and 5 years and 3 months. In the case of the
3 In addition to the cointegration of the spot and futures prices, the daily return series are highly correlated.
Daily spot and futures returns have a correlation of 76.2% for the 2-year note, 93.0% for the 5-year, and 96.2%
for the 10-year. Given that the spot and futures prices are noisy estimates of the unobserved equilibrium
price at any given time, these are very high correlations.
4 The existence of the oﬀ-the-run puzzle indicates that one would expect the on- and oﬀ-the-run prices to
move together, for the bonds to be close substitutes. Note that our cointegration requirement does not
preclude a level diﬀerence between on- and oﬀ-the-run bonds.
610-year, it is between 6.5 years and 10 years. In any case, the assumption of a linear, cointegrating
relation is ultimately an empirical one which we will test.
2.3 Cointegration between the on-the-run spot and adjusted futures prices
Our analysis of the information shares requires the spot and futures prices to be cointegrated.
Arbitrage between spot and futures markets will ensure cointegration between the cheapest-to-
deliver (CTD) bond and the futures contract. Arbitrage will also closely link prices of the cheapest-
to-deliver (CTD) bond and the close-in-maturity on-the-run instrument. Therefore the futures
price and the on-the-run prices should be closely linked. We next show that the on-the-run bonds
and the conversion-factor adjusted futures prices are, in fact, cointegrated.
Denote by   ut the estimated diﬀerence between on-the-run Treasury price pt,N and the basis
adjusted futures price, CFNf
q
t,N,
  ut = p
q
t,N −   βnCFNf
q
t,N. (14)
Note that the conversion factor pertains to the on-the-run instrument.
We need to show that   ut is a stationary process. We follow the suggestion of Engle and Granger
(1987) to use the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on the residuals,
∆  ut = φ0  ut−1 +
 k
i=1 φi∆  ut−i + εt. (15)
Pesavento (2004) shows that the ADF test has good size and reasonable power properties for our
sample size, 400 daily 1-minute returns, and R2 of around 0.20. A rejection of the unit root, using
the t-ratio on φ0, indicates that the spot and futures markets are cointegrated. Even with our daily
sample, we can reject the null of no cointegration, in 98.7% of the cases for the 2-year, 98.5% for
the 5-year, and 94.2% for the 10-year. We ﬁnd this evidence very persuasive, given the well known
diﬃculty of rejecting the unit root hypothesis for alternative hypotheses that imply persistent data.
Establishing that the basis adjusted futures price and the on-the-run spot market bond appear
to be cointegrated is, to our knowledge, a new result.
2.4 Information shares
2.4.1 Hasbrouck measure
Hasbrouck (1995) introduced the notion of information share, which is derived from the Stock-
Watson (1988) permanent/transitory decomposition. The vector moving average (VMA) represen-
7tation for returns provides the elements necessary to calculate the information share,
∆pt = Ψ(L)εt. (16)
Hasbrouck notes that the sum of the N × N moving average matrices, Ψ(1) =
 ∞
j=0 Ψ(Lj), rep-
resents the long-run multipliers, the permanent eﬀect of the shock vector on all the cointegrated
security prices.
Fortunately, the error-correction framework provides the long-run multipliers, Ψ(1), far more
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where π is a scalar factor under our assumption of a single common factor. β⊥ and α⊥ are the
orthogonal complements5 of the original parameter vectors in (6) and (5). Because the prices are
cointegrated, each error term must have the same long-run impact on prices. This means that all
the rows in (17) are identical.
To obtain the contributions of shocks to market i on the permanent component of prices, we
follow Hasbrouck and perform a Choleski decomposition on   = E [εtε′
t], the N × N covariance
matrix, to ﬁnd a lower triangular matrix M, whose i,jth element we denote mij, such that
MM′ =  . We now deﬁne, in the same manner as Baillie et al. (2002), the Hasbrouck information
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2. (18)
where the γi are the elements of row i of the long-run multipliers in (17).
The denominator is the total variance of the permanent component of the one-step price change;
it can equivalently be written as γ′ γ, where γ is the N × 1 vector consisting of the γi’s. The
numerator is the jth shock’s contribution to the variance of the permanent component of prices,
including the covariance of the jth shock with shocks {j + 1,j + 2,...,N}. That is, market j’s
information share is the proportion of variance in the common factor that is attributable to shocks
in market j.
The Hasbrouck information share is closely related to the forecast error decomposition in con-
ventional VAR modeling. Like that decomposition, it may be sensitive to the ordering of the
5 The orthogonal complement of a vector α is denoted α⊥ and solves the linear equation α′α⊥ = 0.
8variables in the VAR — which is an implicit identiﬁcation scheme — if the errors εt are contempo-
raneously correlated. That is, the Hasbrouck share of the jth market will generally include the
variance of the jth shock plus the contribution of the covariance of the jth shock with later shocks.
Putting a variable earlier in the ordering will increase its information share. In a two-variable
system, the two possible orderings will provide upper and lower bounds on the information shares
of the variables. In larger systems, the ﬁrst and last orderings will give the greatest/least possible
information share for a given variable.
Systems with correlated errors create inherent uncertainty about information shares. This
uncertainty reﬂects the fact that one simply cannot identify price leadership between two markets
when the prices in those markets move together during the sampling interval. Longer sampling
intervals create higher correlations between markets, increasing the ambiguity about information
shares. Hasbrouck’s (1995) study used a one-second sampling interval and found that the lower
and upper bounds were very close. Most studies use longer sampling intervals and ﬁnd that the
lower/upper bounds are much wider and that inference depends to some degree on the ordering
of the variables. This paper reports both the Hasbrouck lower- and upper-bound (HL and HU)
estimates for the GovPX market share.
2.4.2 Harris-McInish-Wood measure
The literature contains an active and ongoing discussion of the interpretation of the information
share. Harris, McInish, and Wood (2002) have argued for the use of an alternative decomposition
based on the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common-factor approach.
Gonzalo and Granger decompose the price vector into permanent, gt, and transitory, ht, com-
ponents,
pt = θ1gt + θ2ht, (19)
where the permanent component is a linear combination of current prices, gt = Γpt. The ad-
ditional identifying assumption that ht does not Granger-cause gt implies that θ1 = β⊥α′
⊥ =
(γ1,γ2,...,γN)′, where the γi are deﬁned in (17). The weights given to price discovery are deﬁned







What is the relation between the Hasbrouck information share and the HMW permanent-
9transitory price weights? Both measures are deﬁned in terms of the orthogonal complement α⊥to
the cointegrating vector, but they diﬀer in how this information is used. De Jong (2002) points
out that the Hasbrouck information share vector includes the γ’s , but they are normalized by
the total variance of the common trends innovations. The HMW weights can be interpreted
as the limit of the change in the price with respect to the shock vector, as the time horizon
goes to inﬁnity. H measures each shock’s share of the variance of the one-step-ahead permanent
component. Uncorrelated shocks and similarly sized shocks (across markets) will equalize the
measures. De Jong (2002) compares the relation between the two measures to the relation between
a regression coeﬃcient (HMW) and a partial R2 (H).
Which measure is better? De Jong says that both measures have their merits. The HMW
measure permits one to reconstruct the eﬃcient price history from the full innovation vector while
Hasbrouck’s information share describes how much price variation that the shocks to each market
explain. De Jong believes H to be a more useful deﬁnition of price discovery. Baillie et al. (2002)
believe that Hasbrouck’s method has more general appeal and interpretation. But Harris, McInish,
and Wood (2002) argue that the HMW measure recovers the true microstructure in a wide range
of ﬁnancial market models. As Lehmann (2002) argues, the VECM is a reduced form, so examples
can be constructed in which either measure is arbitrarily good or bad. Lehmann concludes that it
is sensible to report both estimates.
2.5 Bivariate case
The general model simpliﬁes quite a bit in the case N = 2, as in our study of the relative information
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We follow Baillie, et al. (2002) by constructing information shares from the error-correction
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10where MM′ =  .
The Hasbrouck upper-bound information share of the ﬁrst asset in the VAR is
H1 =
(α2σ1,ε + α1ρσ2,ε)2
(α2σ1,ε + α1ρσ2,ε)2 + (α1σ2,ε(1 − ρ2)1/2)2. (24)





Note that if variances are equal (σ1,ε = σ2,ε) and the covariance matrix is diagonal (ρ = 0), the
measures should be quite close.
3. Data
3.1 GovPX
A growing literature explores the screen-based electronic trading markets in U.S. Treasuries. The
GovPX trading platform consolidated quotes and trades from nearly all the major inter-dealer
brokers.6 Fleming (2003) describes the characteristics of liquidity in this market in the period
from 1997 to 2000. Mizrach and Neely (2006) characterize the shift of the interdealer market to
electronic trading.
Three types of Treasury securities are traded on GovPX. The on-the-run Treasury is the most
recently auctioned security of a particular maturity. Previous issues are considered oﬀ-the-run.
The when-issued market consists of trading in securities that are about to be auctioned or are still
to be delivered.
We will look at the on-the-run 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year notes, the most active securities in
the GovPX data set, over the period October 1, 1995, to March 30, 2001. These instruments are
liquid and we can reliably identify7 trades in GovPX in this period.
[INSERT Figure 1 HERE]
Figure 1 shows that most trades are in on-the-run securities. In the 2-year note, for example,
there were an average of 348 on-the-run, 203 oﬀ-the-run, and 29 when-issued trades per day in 1997.
6 The contributing brokers during 1995-2001 included Garban-Intercapital, Garvin Guy Butler, Hilliard
Farber, RMJ, and Tullett & Tokyo Liberty.
7 After March 30, 2001, GovPX no longer reports aggregate trading volume. It is diﬃcult after this point
to identify trades uniquely.
11The volume of on-the-run trading shows no strong trends from 1995 to 1998 but falls substantially
after 1998 for the 5- and 10-year notes. Trading volume in the 2-year note similarly falls after 1999.
There is trading in nearly 22 distinct oﬀ-the-run issues per day, making each individual security
rather illiquid. The oﬀ-the-run Treasuries typically trade at a discount to the on-the-run security
of similar maturity. The academic and practitioner communities debate whether one can exploit
these diﬀerences through arbitrage. The oﬀ-the-run puzzle has been explored most recently in a
theoretical paper by Vayanos and Weill (2005) and in empirical papers by Krishnamurthy (2002)
and Barclay, Hendershott, and Kotz (2006). GovPX trading in oﬀ-the-run securities tends to
decline throughout the sample.
When-issued trading is the smallest portion of the GovPX market. The overall number of
trades can mislead, though. When-issued trading is intense primarily in short periods prior to
auctions. For example, on October 25, 1995, there were 511 trades and a total volume of 5,207
bonds in the when-issued 5-year note. When-issued trading in GovPX declines substantially over
the sample and is negligible by 2001.
The reasons for the decline in GovPX trading over the sample are not entirely clear. The
reduction in federal deﬁcits from 1992 to 2000 reduced the size of the bond market pie, but
Mizrach and Neely (2006) note that primary dealer transactions increased from 1995 to 2001. It
seems more likely that the introduction of electronic communications networks (ECNs), such as
eSpeed in 1999 and Brokertec in 2000, contributed to the decline in GovPX trading.
3.2 Futures
We incorporate futures prices into our study to investigate the relative information content of the
spot and futures markets. Futures markets permit small trades of standardized assets at relatively
low cost or settlement risk. The information content of spot and futures trades diﬀers from market
to market. In stock markets, for example, futures prices generally incorporate information about
market trends more rapidly than those of individual stocks (e.g., de Jong and Nijman (1997)). In
foreign exchange, the evidence is mixed. Hutcheson (2003) ﬁnds that the highly liquid spot market
leads the futures prices. Martens and Kofman (1998) ﬁnd that indicative Reuter’s FXFX spot
market quotes do not subsume the futures market quotes and Rosenberg and Traub (2005) report
that futures order ﬂow seems to dominate in price discovery. Ex ante, it is not obvious whether
spot or derivatives markets should dominate in bond price discovery. Failing to account for futures
prices in a study of Treasury market price discovery could lead to mistaken inference.
12We use 2-, 5- and 10-year historical futures transactions prices, time-stamped to the second.8
These notes trade on the CBOT in an open outcry auction from 8:20 AM to 3:00 PM Eastern
time. We have ﬂoor session data from all three instruments.
This paper follows the usual practice of splicing futures data at the beginning of contract expiry
months: March, June, September and December. For example, settlement prices for the futures
contract expiring in March 1996 are collected for all trading days in December 1995 and January
and February 1996. Then data pertaining to June 1996 contracts are collected from March, April
and May 1996 trading dates. We follow a similar procedure for the September and December
contracts. This method avoids pricing problems near ﬁnal settlement that result from illiquidity
(Johnston, Kracaw and McConnell (1991)).
Figure 2 shows that, in this time period, the most liquid futures market is the 10-year bond
with an average of 560 trades per day over the whole sample. The 5-year is second with an average
of 280 trades per day. The 2-year is a distant third with 47 trades per day.
[INSERT Figure 2 HERE]
There are increasing numbers of trades in all futures contracts during the 1995-2001 sample.
We will see that this trend is mirrored in increasing futures market information shares.
4. Estimates of the Information Shares
We report the HMW and both the Hasbrouck lower- and upper-bound estimates of the GovPX
market information share. To compute the Hasbrouck upper (lower) bound, we place the spot
market ﬁrst (second) in the bivariate VAR. We examine the three most liquid spot market securities,
the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year on-the-run spot bonds, and their maturity matched futures contracts.
Figure 3 shows the annual averages from 1995 to 2001 of daily information shares.
[INSERT Figure 3 HERE]
Table 1 shows the annual averages for the information shares, illustrated in Figure 3, and the
α and β coeﬃcients from the VARs. We report bootstrap standard errors for each.
We explored two ways in which the β′s might vary during the day. The ﬁrst model we considered
was where β changed between the morning, 08:20 to 12:00 and then from 12:00 to 15:00. The
8 Contract details on the Treasury futures may be found at http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/page/ 0,3181,830,00.html.
13second model permitted each β to be a function of a constant and a time trend. Statistical tests
failed to reject a constant β against these alternatives only about as often as one would expect
under the null.
The Hasbrouck and HMW estimates of the GovPX information shares display common patterns
across instruments and over time. First, the GovPX information share measures are negatively
related to the maturity of the instruments and the trading activity in the futures market. That
is, the GovPX share is highest for 2-year notes, where it ranges from 42 to 86 percent, depending
on the measure and the time period. The GovPX share for 5-year notes is lower, varying from 21
to 72 percent. Finally, the GovPX shares are lowest for the 10-year bonds; the Hasbrouck upper
bound never exceeds 50%.
The second common pattern is that all the GovPX information shares rise from 1995, peaking
in 1998. The Hasbrouck estimates for the 2-year and 5-year notes indicate that most price discovery
occurs in the spot market in 1998. The HU estimate of the GovPX share for the 10-year bond
hovers just below 50 percent in that year.
[INSERT Table 1 HERE]
After 1999, GovPX trading volume and information shares decline for all three markets. For
example, by 2001, GovPX performs only 27% of the price discovery in the 5-year market, according
to the HU measure. Likewise, the HU estimate of the GovPX share of the 10-year market declines
very rapidly after 1998, falling to only 17% in 2001.9 The Hasbrouck estimates of the GovPX share
of the 2-year market also declines but GovPX retains the majority share of the shortest maturity
market, for both Hasbrouck measures. The HMW estimate of the GovPX share of the 2-year
market is somewhat lower in 2001, at 42%.
To assess the robustness of our results to the speciﬁcation of β, we reestimated information
shares under two alternative assumptions: 1) β equal to its annual mean value from Table 3 for
each day of the year; 2) β = 1, removing it from the analysis. These changes produce very modest
(0 to 10 percent) level shifts in the average 2-year information shares but very similar information
shares for the 5- and 10-year cases. Neither choice for β aﬀected the qualitative pattern of a
gradual rise and then decline of the GovPX market.
Both GovPX and futures markets inﬂuence tatonnement in the U.S. Treasury market, but the
9 Campbell and Hendry (2006) report a 23.3% average spot market information share across four months in
2000 for the 10-year/ 10-year combination.
14growth of ECNs like eSpeed and BrokerTec, which debuted in 1999 and 2000, respectively, lead to
a growing dominance of the futures market in price discovery.10
[INSERT Table 2 HERE]
The parameters used to construct the price discovery measures also imply estimates of the
half-lives of the deviations from equilibrium. For example, in 1995, the average partial adjustment
coeﬃcient for the 10-year spot market is 0.0424. This value implies a half-life of noisy shocks in
the spot market of 16 minutes.11 The average partial adjustment coeﬃcient falls to 0.0139 in 2001,
raising the half life to 49 minutes. Table 2 reports similar estimates for the 2-year and 5-year
notes. For the 5- and 10-year notes, the diﬀerence between maximum and minimum half-lives is
substantial. The maximum half life for the 5- and 10-year notes are more than two and three times
the level of the minimum half lives.
Adjustment in the futures market is quicker, never taking more than 15 minutes. For the
actively traded 5- and 10-year contracts, adjustment occurs in 7 minutes or less. These estimates
provide an intuitive measure of the time necessary to correct disequilibria.
5. Predictability of Information Share
What observable characteristics of market structure explain information shares? Yan and Zivot
(2004) address this question in a structural VAR. We consider the question using the time series
of daily estimates of the spot market’s information share, ISt, for both the HMW and the upper
bound12 HU measures. To determine whether liquidity measures explain information shares, we
estimate the regression,
ln(IS1,t/(1 − IS1,t)) = c + b1 ln(S1,t/(S1,t + S2,t)) + b2 ln(N1,t/(N1,t + N2,t)) (26)
+b3 ln(RV1,t/(RV1,t + RV2,t)) + b4 × Trend + εt,
where IS1,t, represents the spot market’s daily HMW or H share and N1,t and N2,t are the daily
number of trades in the cash and futures market.13 S1,t and S2,t are the Thompson and Waller
10 Mizrach and Neely (2006) discuss the rise of Treasury ECNs.
11 That is, 16 is the smallest integer, i, such that 0.5 > (1 − 0.0424)i.
12 Liquidity measures also explain lower bound estimates; results omitted for brevity.
13 We have volume data for the spot market only; but, in any case, we found trades dominated volume in
every speciﬁcation.




i=1 |pi − pi−1|
+ /T+. (27)
T+is the number of non-zero changes in the transactions prices on day t.14 We transform the depen-
dent variable to alleviate the distributional problems associated with limited dependent variables.
RV is the annualized daily realized volatility based on 5-minute, linearly interpolated returns. The
time trend is a simple linear trend.
We hypothesize that a smaller bid-ask spread expedites the tatonnement, b1 < 0. We further
consider whether greater liquidity (trades) should also contribute to a larger information share,
b2 > 0. Finally, noisy trades should diminish the information share, so we anticipate that b3 < 0.
We ﬁlter out 1% of the days where trading activity is skewed heavily toward either the spot or
futures markets. The days of disproportionate activity in futures markets are usually associated
with holidays or the very end of the sample. The spot market tends to have disproportionate
activity near the futures contract rollover points, when volume is shifting between futures contracts.
Eliminating these outliers allows us to more precisely estimate the impact of trading activity on
information shares.
[INSERT Table 3 HERE]
Table 3 illustrates that microstructure variables strongly explain the GovPX information share
estimates. For both the Hasbrouck upper-bound and HMW shares, an increase in relative spread in
the spot market decreases the spot-market information share in all 6 combinations. An increase in
the realized volatility of the spot market also lowers information signiﬁcantly across all maturities.
The spot market’s information share rises with its proportion of trades in the cash market, but the
results are signiﬁcant only for the 2- and 10-year.
The R
2s from equation (26) range from just 5% for the 2-year Hasbrouck estimates to 21% for
the 5-year. We conclude that standard liquidity measures strongly capture daily ﬂuctuations in
the information share.
We think the ability to quickly compute a back-of-the-envelope estimate of information share
will be of great practical value. For example, we are missing the data for 1999 from the CBOT
for the 2-year note futures, but we can calculate an estimate of the GovPX information share for
14 We have only transactions prices for the futures market, so we are unable to compute quoted spreads. In
the GovPX data, the correlation between quoted spreads and the Thompson and Waller spreads is 0.99.
161998. Interpolating average spreads and trades between 1998 and 2000, we obtain the following
estimate for the 1999 HMW information share
ln(IS1/(1 − IS1)) = −3.150 − 2.601 × −0.9351 + 0.882 × −0.1696
−1.206 × −0.6722 + 0.107 × 4.5
= 0.4249
which implies an HMW share of 60.46%. Averaging the 1998 and 2000 shares would produce a
lower estimate of 50.11%.
The model can also be applied out-of-sample. Using actual futures trading activity and spreads
in the 10-year note for 2002, and (optimistically) assuming that GovPX measures stay at 2001
levels, we compute a Hasbrouck upper bound of
ln(IS1/(1 − IS1)) = −6.612 − 2.553 × −0.3148 + 1.263 × −3.0921
−4.463 × −0.8045 + 0.666 × 7.5
= −4.7186.
which translates into an information share of less than 1%.
We next turn to how the release of public information aﬀects information shares.
6. Macro and FOMC Announcements
The literature on Treasury microstructure has focused on the release of public information. These
event studies provide an opportunity to assess the possible changes in liquidity and information
shares. As Fleming and Remolona (1999b) note: “In contrast to stock prices, U.S. Treasury security
prices largely react to the arrival of public information on the economy.” Brandt and Kavajecz
(2004) draw a more cautious conclusion, ﬁnding that order ﬂow imbalances can explain up to 26%
of the day-to-day variation in yields on non-announcement days. Our focus here is on information
shares and if they change substantially during macroeconomic and/or FOMC announcements.
Why do we control for these announcements? Because the timing of such announcements is
predictable, individuals can anticipate that prices might change quickly and might choose to trade
in one of the markets based on an ability to observe prices and trade rapidly. The average level of
activity in the spot versus futures markets might not be informative about the market’s contribution
to price discovery around the times of macro announcements. Therefore it is important to control
17for such announcements in assessing the inﬂuence of trading activity and spreads on price discovery
measures.
6.1 Data
We have data on the dates and times of 8 important U.S. macroeconomic announcements and
3 types of FOMC related events. One group of macro announcements is related to the labor
market: (1) initial jobless claims; (2) employees on nonfarm payrolls. The second group provides
information about prices: (3) consumer price index; (4) producer price index. The remaining four
provide information about business cycle conditions: (5) durable goods; (6) housing starts; (7)
trade balance of goods and services; and (8) leading indicators. These are the same announcements
used in Green (2004), except for retail sales. We also look at (9) the FOMC announcements, (10)
releases of minutes, and (11) unexpected FOMC events. All of these are predictable except the
unexpected FOMC events.
Several studies, including: Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999a), Balduzzi, Elton and Green
(2001), Huang, Cai and Wang (2002), Green (2004), and Brandt, Kavacejz, and Underwood (2006),
have looked at the impact of macroeconomic announcements on the spot bond market. Fleming
and Remolona (1997, 1999a) ﬁnd that the surprise components of macroeconomic announcements
are associated with the largest increases in trading volume and the largest price shocks in the
GovPX bond market (all instruments) from August 23, 1993, to August 19, 1994. Balduzzi, Elton
and Green (2001) ﬁnd that 17 news releases inﬂuence bonds of various maturities in diﬀerent
ways. The adjustment to news occurs within one minute and bid-ask spreads return to normal
values after ﬁve to 15 minutes, but increases in volatility and trading volume persist. Huang, Cai
and Wang (2002) study trading patterns, announcement eﬀects and volatility—volume relations in
the trading behavior of primary dealers in the 5-year Treasury note inter-dealer broker market.
Brandt, Kavacejz, and Underwood (2006) control for macroeconomic announcements in estimating
the impact of bond market order ﬂow on prices. Boukus and Rosenberg (2006) examine the eﬀect
of FOMC minutes releases on the Treasury yield curve.
Ederington and Lee (1993) examine the impact of monthly economic announcements on Trea-
sury bond futures prices. The employment, PPI, CPI and durable goods orders releases produce
the greatest impact of the 9 signiﬁcant announcements, out of 16 studied. Andersen, Bollerslev,
Diebold and Vega (2007) study the reaction of international equity, bond and foreign exchange
markets to U.S. macroeconomic announcements.
18The only paper to look directly at bond market information shares during times of stress is
Upper and Werner (2002). Comparing relatively illiquid cheapest-to-deliver German Bund spot
market prices to the futures market, their paper ﬁnds that the spot market contribution to price
discovery during the 1998 Long Term Capital Management crisis is essentially zero.
6.2 Information share on announcement days
To investigate whether information shares diﬀer from normal on the days of macroeconomic an-
nouncements, we regress the Hasbrouck upper bound and HMW information shares on a constant,
the time trend, and a dummy variable,
ln(IS1,t/(1 − IS1,t)) = c + b4 × Trend + b5Di,t + εt. (28)
Di,t = 1 for days of the 11 announcements and zero otherwise. We use information shares computed
earlier for the entire trading day, 8:20 to 15:00. Results for all three maturities are in Table 4.
We also test whether the announcements inﬂuence information shares through spreads and
trades–or whether their eﬀects are independent of those liquidity variables–by adding an an-
nouncement indicator to the model (26),
ln(IS1,t/(1 − IS1,t)) = c + b1 ln(S1,t/(S1,t + S2,t)) + b2 ln(N1,t/(N1,t + N2,t)) + (29)
b3 ln(RV1,t/(RV1,t + RV2,t)) + b4 × Trend + b′
5Di,t + εt.
[INSERT Table 4 HERE]
Table 4 displays the results of (28) and (29). The odd numbered columns of Table 4 show the
coeﬃcients, b5, on the 8 macro and 3 FOMC announcements, obtained by estimating (28). The
dependent variables were the transformations of the HU measure (upper panel) and HMW shares
(lower panel). The boldfaced coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The top panel
of Table 4 reveals that jobless claims, CPI, durables, PPI and non-farm payrolls are signiﬁcant
announcements. The CPI, PPI and payrolls are all signiﬁcantly negative for the 5- and 10-year
Hasbrouck shares. Jobless claims and PPI are signiﬁcantly negative for the HMW shares for the 5-
and 10-year markets. Nonfarm payrolls and the unscheduled FOMC announcements for the 2-year
HMW share are the only coeﬃcients which are signiﬁcantly positive.
In summary, in 15 of 48 cases, macro announcements signiﬁcantly lower the relative GovPX
share of price discovery during the business day of the macro announcement. This shift in price
19discovery is especially likely to happen for the 5- and 10-year instruments. The declines are modest
though. Over all announcements, the declines average 3.76% for the HU and 0.70% for the HMW.15
This does not indicate a dramatic preference for the futures market. Nevertheless, the statistically
signiﬁcant variables are associated with average declines of 3 to 16% in the GovPX information
shares.
The even numbered columns of Table 4 show the coeﬃcients b′
5 on the macro and FOMC
announcements in (29). There are only 4 of 66 statistically signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcients after
the inclusion of spreads, trades and realized volatility. The positive coeﬃcients on non-farm payrolls
and the unscheduled FOMC announcements for the 2-year note are no longer signiﬁcant. For
the HU measure of price discovery, the only signiﬁcant impact remaining is durables for the 2-
year note. The decline in statistical signiﬁcance for macro announcements in (29) indicates that
relative liquidity and volatility subsume the explanatory impact. Of course, the news releases can
be predicted in advance, while the changes in relative liquidity/volatiltiy are much less predictable.
To check the robustness of these results, we recomputed information shares for the 1-hour in-
terval after typical macro announcement times, 8:30 - 9:30 a.m.. That is, we computed information
shares, spreads, trade volume and volatility in a one-hour window and recomputed the regression
results from (28) and (29) to see if announcements and liquidity measures explain information
shares within this narrow window. While we omit the full results for the sake of brevity, we ﬁnd
that as one might expect, news releases have a greater impact on information shares in a narrow
window after announcements. Information shares for the spot market are signiﬁcantly lower in the
morning window for 20 of 48 macro announcements. The average impact on price shares over the
20 signiﬁcant announcements range from 4 to 18 percent. After controlling for spreads, trades and
volatility, however, only 7 announcements are signiﬁcant. Again, the relative liquidity/volatility
variables subsume the information about releases. The most pertinent event is again the CPI with
3 signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients, even after the inclusion of liquidity variables.
We think this provides some perspective on the results in this paper compared to the prior
literature. Information shares of the more highly leveraged futures markets do often rise modestly
but in a predictable way, consistent,with changes in relative liquidity and volatility.
15 We computed the average declines directly; they are not shown in the tables for the sake of brevity.
207. Conclusion
This paper has examined three very active spot and futures markets: the 2- and 5-year spot notes
and 10-year spot bonds, and the corresponding futures markets. We analyzed high-frequency tick
data from the GovPX trading platform and the Chicago Board of Trade over the period 1995-2001.
This paper is the ﬁrst to investigate information shares in the price discovery process in the
U.S. bond market across a range of maturities, in both spot and futures markets. We employed
bivariate VECM systems to estimate information shares for the common component of bond prices
of similar maturities. GovPX information shares are highest in the 2-year note where futures market
trading is the least active. The GovPX market’s information shares rise from 1995 to 1998 for all
instruments, but then decline signiﬁcantly. By 2001, the Hasbrouck information share lower bound,
HL, for GovPX is only 22% in the 5-year and 14.5% in the 10-year. Only in the 2-year note does
the GovPX spot market maintain the bulk of price discovery. The HL for the GovPX 2-year note
declines from 72% in 1998 to only 55% in 2001. The importance of the futures market in all periods
suggests that bond-market studies that exclude this market might be misleading or incomplete.
We also provide a new result that standard liquidity measures, including the number of trades,
relative bid-ask spreads, and realized volatility strongly explain daily bond-market information
shares in an economically sensible way. The GovPX information shares decline in a statistically
signiﬁcant fashion during days of a number of macroeconomic news releases. This eﬀect is even
stronger in a one-hour window after the times of macroeconomic news releases. Days of macroeco-
nomic announcements rarely predict information shares independently of their eﬀects through the
liquidity and volatility measures, however.
Our results illustrate that both transitory factors, such as daily variation in liquidity, volatility
and macroeconomic announcements, and long-term trends, such as the movement to electronic
markets, inﬂuence price discovery.
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Notes: The entries are annual averages of daily trading volume from the GovPX trading plat-
form. The on-the-run Treasury security is the most recently auctioned security of that maturity.
The rest are considered oﬀ-the-run. The when-issued market consists of trading in securities that
are about to be auctioned.
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Notes: We report annual average trading activity in the 2-, 5-, and 10-year CBOT futures
contracts. The calculations are based on a continuous futures contract, assuming that contracts
rollover on the ﬁrst day of the expiration month. The CBOT 2-year futures data for 1999 are
incomplete, so we do not report an average for that year.
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Notes: The ﬁgures show the annual averages of the daily information share estimates for the
spot market. We use 1-minute returns. The upper-bound Hasbrouck information share (18),
places the spot market ﬁrst in a bivariate system, and the lower-bound places it second. The
Harris-McInish-Wood information share is given by (20).
27Table 1
VAR Estimates



















































































































































































































































Notes: The table shows the annual averages of the daily information share estimates for the
GovPX spot market. We use 1-minute returns. HU is the Hasbrouck information share (18), with
the spot market ﬁrst in a bivariate system, and HL places it second. HMW is the Harris-McInish-
Wood information share (20). β, α1 and α2 are the parameters from the VAR system (5) and(6).





Min Max Min Max Min Max
Year 2001 1995 2000 2001 1995 2001
α2 0.0496 0.0409 0.0680 0.0314 0.0424 0.0139
Half-Life (mins.) 14 17 10 22 16 49
CBOT Futures Market
2-year 5-year 10-year
Min Max Min Max Min Max
Year 2001 1997 1997 1998 1995 2001
α1 0.1006 0.0458 0.2269 0.1287 0.1838 0.1083
Half-Life (mins.) 7 15 3 6 4 7
Notes: The table reports maximum and minimum half lives implied by the daily average partial
adjustment coeﬃcients in the GovPX spot market, α2 and the CBOT futures market, α1. Half-lives
are the expected number of minutes for 50% of a shock to the spot market to dissipate.
29Table 3
Models for the Information Share
Hasbrouck HMW
Mat. Const. Spreads Trades RV Trend R2 Const. Spreads Trades RV Trend R2
2-year -0.18 -1.14 3.08 -3.02 0.18 0.05 -3.15 -2.60 0.88 -1.21 0.11 0.13
(0.61) (0.57) (0.66) (0.60) (0.07) (0.30) (0.28) (0.33) (0.30) (0.03)
5-year -11.39 -9.63 0.34 -3.11 0.54 0.21 -6.37 -3.16 0.49 -2.44 0.28 0.13
(0.97) (0.97) (0.52) (0.96) (0.06) (0.55) (0.54) (0.29) (0.54) (0.04)
10-year -6.61 -2.55 1.26 -4.46 0.67 0.15 -5.20 -1.58 0.36 -2.63 0.26 0.09
(0.61) (0.49) (0.21) (0.63) (0.06) (0.38) (0.31) (0.13) (0.40) (0.04)
Notes: The table reports estimates of (26). The dependent variable is a transformation (ln(IS/(1 − IS))) of the Hasbrouck
upper bound or Harris-McInish-Wood (right panel) information share for the spot market in a bivariate system with the maturity
matched futures market. Regressions use daily data from October 1, 1995, to March 30, 2001. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Bold type indicates coeﬃcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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Jobless -0.042 -0.071 -0.340 -0.127 -0.289 -0.151
CPI 0.379 0.346 -0.753 -0.137 -0.564 -0.163
Durables -1.224 -1.275 -0.440 -0.251 -0.206 0.004
Housing -0.230 -0.267 -0.280 -0.158 -0.393 -0.349
Leading Ind. 0.061 0.000 0.111 0.249 0.295 0.369
Trade -0.086 -0.008 -0.031 -0.134 0.045 0.005
Payrolls 0.313 -0.052 -1.423 -0.020 -0.655 0.167
PPI 0.607 0.416 -1.301 -0.556 -0.866 -0.392
FOMC
Announcement 0.202 0.241 -0.762 -0.430 -0.483 -0.505
Minutes 0.375 0.512 -0.021 0.245 -0.463 -0.338







Jobless -0.137 -0.218 -0.237 -0.138 -0.243 -0.178
CPI 0.199 0.136 -0.564 -0.326 -0.311 -0.106
Durables -0.950 -0.992 -0.262 -0.190 -0.084 0.031
Housing -0.070 -0.028 -0.182 -0.115 -0.255 -0.221
Leading Ind. 0.145 0.081 0.190 0.257 0.216 0.258
Trade 0.102 0.141 0.094 0.054 0.047 0.033
Payrolls 0.378 -0.002 -0.306 0.247 -0.377 0.030
PPI 0.258 0.119 -0.389 -0.095 -0.450 -0.211
FOMC
Announcement 0.085 0.035 -0.148 -0.028 0.168 0.142
Minutes 0.252 0.371 -0.259 -0.158 -0.249 -0.205
Unscheduled 2.332 2.080 0.134 0.548 -0.235 -0.088
Notes: The table reports estimates of (28) in the ﬁrst, third and ﬁfth columns and those
from (29) in the second, fourth and sixth columns. The dependent variable is a transformation
(ln(IS/(1 − IS))) of the Hasbrouck upper bound (ﬁrst panel) or Harris-McInish-Wood (second
panel) information share for the GovPX market. The odd columns (labeled b5) report results
from estimates that do not control for daily liquidity (28), and the even columns (labeled b5’) add
relative spreads, trades and volatility (29). Regressions use daily data from October 1, 1995, to
March 30, 2001. Bold type indicates coeﬃcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at the two-sided
5 percent level.
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